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I T IS A GREAT HONOUR to be invited to give the inaugural 
Stout Lecture and it is also a great 
pleasure to return to the University 
that first risked employing me as a 
lecturer in political science more 
than 30 years ago. I am pleased, too, 
to be among so many old friends, 
many of them fellow survivors from 
that far-off era. Just how far-off can 
be underlined by recalling that, 
when I arrived in Wellington, Keith 
Holyoake was Prime Minister and, 
indeed, had another election still to 
win. Robert Muldoon was a fresh-
faced Minister of Finance, basking 
in the success of decimal currency 
and brandishing his fisca l scalpel. 
He attacked the large number of 
students studying anthropology in 
the universities and questioned 
state spending on the arts. The 
threa tened intelligentsia coined the 
term 'Muldoonism' to refer to the 
values of the cost accountant 
intruding into matters supposedly 
exempt from financial scrutiny. One 
of my new colleagues, who was 
close to the Na tional Party, assured 
me that Muldoon was not trusted 
by the caucus and would never be 
party leader. Political scientists, of 
course, were never very good at 
predictions, though not markedly 
worse than meteorologists, seis-
mologists or economists. Muldoon, 
as we know, went on to become 
National party leader and then 
Prime Minister. His interventionist 
style of economic management 
became the point of departure for 
much of the restructuring that 
followed. In the process, the concept 
of 'Muldoonism' was reminted. It 
now implies outmoded policies of 
state control of the economy and is 
often mentioned in the same breath 
as state socialism or, even, Stalin-
ism. Meanwhile, the earlier, forgot-
ten Muldoonism, signifying the 
values of the cost accountant, has 
gone on to flourish to an ex tent far 
beyond anything its namesake 
could have imagined. The focus of 
this lecture will be on the last 
decade and a half, the post-
Muldoon years. But an excursus 
into history may remind us of the 
importance of underlying continui-
ties that are so often overlooked by 
reformers keen to exaggerate the 
extent of their radicalism and the 
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novelty of their prescriptions. At the 
same time, recalling the 
unpredictability of politics under-
lines the complexity of our subject 
and the tentativeness of our conclu-
sions. The past ma y look more 
straightforward than the future but 
only because the choices have all 
been made and the patterns can 
now be imposed. It did not follow 
simpler rules. 
During the last nearly 15 years, 
since the election of the Lange 
government in 1984, New Zealand 
has undergone a remarkable set of 
institutional changes, economic, 
political and social. All are interre-
lated, though they emerged at 
different times and in response to 
different problems. In this lecture, I 
intend to concentra te on two 
changes, or sets of changes, to 
political institutions: the restructur-
ing of the state sector and the 
transforma tion of the electoral 
system. The question I will pose, 
though not satisfactorily answer, is 
how successful these particular 
changes have been in enhancing the 
democratic accountability of New 
Zealand governments. It has 
become fashionable among com-
mentators to label these changes as 
'experiments', a tern1 of sotne 
significance which appeals to a 
long-standing tradition in New 
Zealand's political culture. State 
experiments suggest the idea of 
New Zealand as a 'social labora-
tory', daringly pioneering important 
social advances which will later 
become adopted by the more 
sluggish and conservative countries 
of the old world. It is almost a 
century since Pember Reeves 
published his account of Australa-
sian innovations in industrial 
arbitration under the title of Stale 
Experiments iu Australia a11d New 
Zealaud. It was Reeves himself who 
became anointed by historians of 
the left as the found ing father of 
intellectual radicalism in New 
Zealand politics. Direct personal 
links can be traced between aca-
demic purveyors of this tradition, 
such as Keith Sin clair and Robert 
Chapman, and leading members of 
the Lange Labour government, 
notably Roger Douglas and Michael 
Bassett. Ministers in that govern-
ment, who had li ved through the 
one-term disappointments of the 
Nash and Kirk / Rowling govern-
ments, were determined to make a 
radical mark on history like that of 
the Liberals of the 1890s and Labour 
of the 1930s. 
More important than these 
individual influences and 
motivations is the broader tradition 
of experiment on w hich they drew 
and which sustained them and their 
supporters through periods of risk 
and uncertai nty. New Zealand has a 
proud history of social and political 
innovation and New Zealand 
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policy-makers considering bold and 
untried initiatives can readily cast 
themselves in the familiar, if 
challenging, role of world pace-
setters. As citizens of a small 
country distant from the centres of 
world power and mass media 
preoccupation, New Zealanders 
crave international attention and 
recognition. That the world should 
sit up and take notice of what is 
being done here provides the 
ultimate authentication of our 
existence. Hence the attraction of 
the concept of experimenting which 
suggests a wider audience. New 
Zealand is trying new things out not 
just for itself but for the world at 
large. It is the world's laboratory, 
providing evidence for foreigners of 
radical and progressive solutions to 
common problems. 
In recent years, there have 
certainly been plenty of foreign 
observers keen to comment on New 
Zealand 's experiments. Most of 
their judgments, of course, have 
relied heavily on the views of those 
New Zealanders they have talked 
to . One of the corollaries of New 
Zealand's peripheral position on the 
world stage is that most foreign 
visitors arrive unencumbered wi th 
substantial prior knowledge of the 
country. They are blank slates 
waiting to be filled in with the 
opinions of those locals to whom 
they are directed by their profes-
sional links and ideological predis-
positions. Visiting economists talk 
to Treasury; trade unionists and 
left-wing politicians call on the CTU 
and the Alliance; sceptical social 
scientists head for the university. 
Few are surprised or disappointed 
by what they find . Returning home, 
they publish reports to serve their 
domestic purposes. Living in 
Australia, one observes the effects 
of these supposed 'fact-finding' 
fo rays over to New Zealand. New 
Zealand is regularly quoted as a 
clinching example on both sides of a 
number of policy arguments, such 
as the value of purchaser I provider 
splits, workplace deregulation and 
currently, of course, the infamous 
GST. Back in New Zealand, too, the 
reports of foreign observers may 
have considerable weight, being the 
views of local informants now 
transformed into those of Overseas 
Experts. Headlines such as 'OECD 
backs ca lls for further government 
reforms' or 'US professor questions 
government direction' provide 
valuable propaganda for local 
interests. Harnessing the opinion of 
overseas experts is a well-estab-
lished part of domestic political 
debate. 
The two se ts of changes under 
consideration this evening have 
at tracted their full share of overseas 
interest, though not usually to-
gether. Most attention has been on 
the state sector changes which have 
been in progress for more than a 
decade and which have been widely 
endorsed as at the 'cutting edge' 
(some would say 'chopping block') 
of public sector reform . But the 
more recent radical change to the 
electoral system from First past the 
Post to MMP has also been under 
scrutiny, most recently from a 
delegation from the UK Commis-
sion on Voting Systems. However, 
in making assessments of these 
experiments, we will do best to back 
our own judgement and not give too 
much weight to overseas opinion 
Vol 8 No Sept e mber 1998 13 
which is usually so derivative. 
Though both the sta te sector 
reforms and electoral reforms are 
both radical innovations and 
international pace-setters, they are 
not part of the same reforming 
movement. State restructuring had 
its origins within sections of the 
bureaucracy supported by sympa-
thetic ministers first in Labour and 
then in National. The earliest 
moves, to corporatise and then 
privatise state trading enterprises, 
were partly in response to economic 
imperatives to reduce government 
expenditure and debt and were 
enthusiastically supported by 
grateful beneficiaries in the private 
sector. Restructuring of the remain-
ing public sector, however, particu-
larly of the core public service 
departments, was largely an 
internal preoccupation of bureau-
crats and ministers. It was of little 
direct concern to the wider voting 
public and certainly not initiated in 
response to any public demand, 
actual or perceived. By contrast, 
change to the electoral system was a 
broadly popular initiative, forced 
upon political and business elite 
against their will. If anything, 
electoral change was a reaction 
against state restructuring, at least 
against the blitzkrieg methods by 
which such restructuring was 
brought about. Though radical in its 
substance, electoral reform was 
essentially reactionary in intention, 
an attempted counter-revolution 
against the policy-making elites. 
Yet different though their 
origins may be, both sets of reforms 
are worth considering together, if 
only because both shared at least one 
common objective, that of making 
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government more accountable to 
the people. It is this objective of 
improved accountability which 
provides the main focus of my 
remarks this evening. Accountabil-
ity is a complex concept, implying a 
relationship of superior and subor-
dinate or, in the fashionable jargon 
of economics and public choice, a 
relationship of principal and agent. 
Accountability refers to the duty of 
subordinate agents to answer to, and 
take direction from, their principals 
or superiors. Modern systems of 
democratic government are grounded 
in the ultimate sovereignty of the 
people. Governments are the agents 
of the people who are their princi-
pals, and governments are therefore 
accountable to the people as their 
agents. This public accountability of 
governments is achieved through a 
number of different constitutional 
relationships, including that of 
elected politicians to electors, public 
servants to ministers, ministers and 
public servants to parliament, 
government agencies to the courts, 
and so on. 
The two sets of reforms have 
been aimed at different sectors of 
government and different links in 
the accountability chain: state sector 
reform was focused on the account-
ability of bureaucrats, to both 
ministers and Parliament, while 
electoral reform was meant to make 
min isters and politicians generally 
more accountable to the public. But 
both movements shared the aim of 
making government as a whole more 
accountable to the people. In this 
sense, both can be seen as attempts to 
improve New Zealand's democracy 
by enhancing the power of voters to 
ca ll their agents to account. We will 
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concentrate on two main channels: 
the control of ministers over the 
public service and the role of 
Parliament as a conduit between 
vo ters and politicians. 
In the case of the state sector 
reforms, improved public account-
ability was part of a larger and, in 
some ways, contrary agenda. The 
main thrust of the so-called new 
public management has been, 
wherever possible, to replace mo-
nopolistic state control with competi-
tive markets. The result, in the first 
place, has been a considerable 
shrinking in the scope of government 
activity and thus a reduction in the 
scope of democratic control. Func-
tions that were previously conducted 
by public agencies under political 
direction have been progressively 
corporatised and privatised. The 
interests of the public, it is argued, 
are better served by private compa-
nies seeking to maximise their own 
returns unconstrained by the distort-
ing influence of political intervention. 
Whatever the ultimate benefits to 
citizens as consumers, such restruc-
turing has certainly reduced the 
sphere of elected governments. In 
that sense, it has reduced the demo-
cratic capacity of citizens as voters to 
influence collective decisions. At the 
same time, the politicians' room for 
manoeuvre within this shrinking 
sphere of government has been 
significantly reduced by financial 
deregulation and by the growing 
need to placate international financial 
markets. Admittedly, the extent of 
this change and the effect of financial 
deregulation can be exaggerated. The 
policy of New Zea land governments 
has always been, to some extent, 
hostage to worldwide economic 
conditions. The room for manoeuvre 
still remaining for national govern-
ments is often understated by 
powerful special interests wishing to 
cloak their own favoured options in 
the guise of an inevitable globalisa-
tion. None the less, compared with, 
say, the 1970s, national policy-making 
certa inly takes place within increas-
ingly circumscribed limits. Moreover, 
while the internationalisation of 
national economies is a worldwide 
phenomenon, successive New 
Zealand governments have embraced 
this trend with more enthusiasm than 
most. Whatever the economic benefits 
and costs of such internationalisation, 
one political consequence at least is 
clear: reduction in national autonomy 
produces a reduction in democra tic 
control. While most governments 
have faced similar limitations to their 
autonomy in recent years, the 
democratic loss in New Zealand has 
been particularly severe. 
In the first place, then, the 
attempt to improve the accountabil-
ity of government needs to be seen 
within the context of a significantly 
reduced state sector . Within this 
remaining state sector, the approach 
to accountability in this restructur-
ing process has been curious! y 
ambivalent. On the one hand, there 
has clear! y been an intention to 
assert ministeria l control over the 
public service. The reformers were 
strongly influenced by theories of 
bureaucratic capture. That is, they 
were persuaded that the former 
system had allowed career public 
servants to usurp the controlling 
preroga tive of elected politicians. 
There was therefore a need to 
reasser t the democratic primacy of 
elected governments by strengthen-
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ing the accountability of public 
servants to their ministers. Much of 
the reforms were aimed in this 
direction, particularly changes to 
the re la tionshi p between ministers 
and department heads. 
At the same time, however, the 
reformers had a deep-seated 
suspicion of w hat they saw as the 
undue influence of politicians. The 
need to seek re-elec tion drove 
politicians into preferring short-
term interests over long-term ones 
and into local or personal ones over 
the public interes t. Ways therefore 
needed to be sought to constrain the 
influence of democratically respon-
sive politicians over public policy. It 
was this anti-political attitude 
which had helped to drive the 
process of corporatisation and 
privatisation. It also led to the 
policy of disaggregation whereby 
significant areas of government 
activity were separated from direct 
ministerial control and located in 
more or less independent crown 
entities. Public accountability of 
these was to be achieved through a 
system of published agreements or 
contracts which had the effect of 
limiting the right of governments to 
interfere in the day to day running 
of the organisations. Contracts, too, 
were introduced between ministers 
and department heads, with similar 
dis tancing intent, appearing to give 
department heads more discretion 
over day-to-day administration. 
Thus, if the capacity of elected 
politicians to control the bureauc-
racy is a key link in the chain of 
democratic accountability, the 
reforms appear intended both to 
strengthen and to weaken thi s 
aspect of it. 
The practical effect of these 
competing tendencies can only be 
assessed by examining the actual 
behaviour of politicians and public 
servants. One key relationship is 
that of ministers and department 
heads, or chief executives as they 
are now known. Under the demo-
cra tic chain of accountability, 
ministers are expected to be in 
charge of their departments, and 
departmental heads are required to 
be accountable to them. Under the 
new system this relationship has 
been articulated in terms of minis-
ters determining their desired 
objectives or outcomes and heads of 
departments accepting responsibil-
ity to provide agreed outputs 
purchased by the ministers. H eads 
of department ha ve been placed on 
limited term contracts and are 
subjec t to annual reviews of per-
formance. At the same time, the 
government's corporate manage-
ment process, introduced in 1994, 
links departmen t heads more 
expl icitly into the government's 
overall strategy through the struc-
ture of Strategic Result Areas and 
Key Result Areas. 
The new system is not without 
its drawbacks, particularly in the 
compliance costs involved in the 
detail ed specifi ca tion of departmen-
tal outputs and the complex re-
quirements for regular reporting 
and monitoring. None the less, 
there can be little doubt tha t 
governments are more firmly in 
charge of the core public service 
than they were twenty years ago 
and that the politi cal accountability 
of the core public service has 
thereby been enhanced . This has 
surpri sed a number of observers, 
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myself included, who criticised the 
new system on two broad grounds, 
that it was intellectually flawed and 
politically dangerous. 
Certainly the intellectual 
framework on which the system is 
based, the structure of specified 
outcomes sought by ministers and 
specified outputs purchased from 
departments, is hopelessly naive . It 
attempts to reduce the complex 
process of government to a simple 
matter of ends chosen by politicians 
and means provided by public 
servants. Elementary politica l 
science teaches us that policy-making 
is an incremental process involving 
constant compromise between 
conflicting and shifting values. 
Objectives cannot be clearly speci-
fied in advance. Political scientists 
know, too, that the respective roles 
of minister and public servants 
cannot be clearly distinguished, that 
both are involved in se tting policy 
and both have a say in how it is 
carried out. The relationship is more 
a partnership, though one in which 
the minister has the final say. A 
structure of government based on 
the denial of such elementary truths 
seemed yet another example of the 
ignorant arrogance of economists 
straying into a field too complex for 
their simple minds. The system, we 
thought, was surely destined to fai l. 
We were wrong, however, 
though not in our criticisms of the 
system's logic. The mistake was in 
thinking that p ractitioners would 
need to take the logic literally. We 
underestimated the capacity of 
common sense and professionalism 
to work around impracticable 
dogma. The structure of outcomes 
and outputs, of purchaser and 
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provider, has not prevented depart-
ment heads and ministers from 
working as closely as before; nor 
has the need to specify outputs in 
advance prevented departments 
from reacting flexibly to unforeseen 
contingencies . The ca tegories have 
proved sufficien tly broad and 
porous to cover whatever the 
demands of politicians and the 
experi ence of public servants deem 
appropriate. Indeed , as the business 
management I i tera ture has recog-
nised for some time, the se tting of 
corpora te objectives does not find 
its benefits in its ostensible purpose, 
in the supposed fixing of unambigu-
ous goals. Rather it serves the more 
modes t, but no less valuable, role of 
identifying common values and 
general purposes. Above all, it is the 
very process of objective setting, 
rather than the specific outcomes of 
such a process, that is all-important. 
Ministers are now required regu-
larly to discuss their plans with 
their chief executives and they in 
turn discuss them with their 
subordinates. Even more important, 
the strategic planning process 
requires consultation across the 
whole of government and reinforces 
the politicians' control over the 
public service agenda. These new 
forma l structures of communica tion 
and coordination are perhaps the 
main reason why the accountabi lity 
of public servants to ministers has 
been increased. 
The second fear expressed by 
critics was that the new system 
would be politically dangerous 
because it would weaken traditional 
responsibility of ministers for their 
departments. Certainly, the pure 
theory of outcomes and outputs 
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appears to confine minis ters to 
responsibility for setting outcomes 
and purchasing outputs, while it 
attributes to chief executives the 
responsibility for delivering the 
outputs. In theory, therefore, it 
should be chief executives, not 
ministers, w ho are called to account 
for actions taken or omitted by 
themselves or members of their 
departments. Indeed, part of the 
original rationale was to reduce 
what was seen as undue ministerial 
interference in the day-to-day 
operations of departmen ts. In this 
respect, the new structure of 
relations between ministers and 
chief executives of core departments 
belonged to the broader anti-
politica l s trategy of reducing the 
sphere of political influence, as 
happened with state-owned enter-
prises and other governmen t 
agencies. An arms-length relation-
ship with ministers wou ld, in the 
view of some champions of reform, 
improve efficiency and reduce the 
supposedly distorting effects of 
political interference. Conversely, 
critics of the reforms, including 
myself, argued that reduction in 
political interference would lead to 
a similar result in the democratic 
accountability of public servants to 
Parliament and the electorate. 
In the event, fears that politi-
cians would avoid all responsibility 
for departmental decisions have 
proved exaggerated . Such fears 
foundered on deep-seated expecta-
tions of the public as well as on the 
survival instincts of both politicians 
and public servants. Certainly, some 
departmental heads have become 
less anonymous than in the past and 
more willing to face media scrutiny. 
Ministers, however, ha ve not been 
able to avoid taking vicarious 
responsibility for their portfolios in 
the traditional way demanded by 
the conventions of ministerial 
responsibility. This concept is 
regularly misrepresented as requir-
ing ministers to resign in all cases of 
maladministration. Long experience 
has convinced me that patient 
academic analysis of the concept 
has no power to p revail over the 
self-serving rhetoric of opposition 
politicians, backed by the cynica l 
ignorance of journalists . Be tha t as it 
may, the actual conventions of the 
concept, that ministers front up for 
their departments and ensure that 
appropriate remedies are taken 
when faults come to light, are still 
strongly entrenched . As was revealed 
at the time of the Cave Creek tragedy, 
the public are simply not prepared 
to let ministers off the hook w hen 
things go wrong. The attempt to 
separate politicians from adminis-
tra tive responsibility tends to break 
down in times of crisis, as it has done 
in other similar jurisdictions overseas, 
such as the United Kingdom. 
If the public expect politicians to 
carry the can, most public servants 
are happy to hand the can to them. 
Public service anonymity has long 
been seen as par t of the p rofessional 
standards of a politically neutral 
public service. In general, the attempt 
to d istinguish clearly between the 
role of ministers and departmental 
public servants has not led to as 
much reduction ii1 ministerial 
responsibility as was fea red by 
critics or, indeed, as was hoped for 
by some of the reformers. Nor, as 
suggested ea rlier, is this to be 
regretted. Min isterial intervention 
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in departments, so-ca lled political 
interference, is in fact the life-blood 
of democratic control and a vital 
means by which the opinions of the 
public can affect government deci-
sions. This assumption is strongly 
grounded in the political expectations 
of all interested pa rties, including 
ministers, public serva nts, members 
of the public and the media. Long-
standing conventions in the politica l 
culture are not easily overridden. 
Similar expectations ha ve also 
ex tended beyond the core public 
service to those arms-length public 
agencies which have been removed 
from direct ministerial control, as 
fo r example in health and science. 
H ere, the anti-political thrust of 
some of the reformers was even 
more evident. Arms-length constitu-
tional relationships made it easier to 
confine the role of ministers to the 
setting of general objectives, leaving 
the day to day decisions to adminis-
trators charged w ith meeting these 
objectives. The relationships 
between governments, purchasing 
institutions and p roviding enter-
prises are governed by contracts. 
These contracts in theory, provide 
transparency and therefore account-
abili ty to the structure as a w hole. 
However, the mere fac t of transpar-
ency, tha t is publicity of informa-
tion, is not in itself sufficient to 
guarantee accountability to the 
public. It implies not only giving an 
account but also accepting d irec-
tion. For it to be effective there must 
also be clear mechanisms by which 
members of the public or their 
elected representatives can use such 
information to impose remed ies or 
new directions on the public 
official s concerned. Reforms that 
were explicitly designed to reduce the 
influence of such political pressure 
could hard ly be said to have 
enhanced political accountability. 
They might increase the efficiency of 
service provision and even improve 
its quality, but a t the expense of 
political accountability not because 
of it. At times of crisis, for instance 
in the health service, serious cracks 
have appeared in the chain of 
accountability when the public has 
demanded action and ministers 
ha ve been una ble to deliver. 
Again, however, we should not 
underestimate the capaci ty of 
common sense and professionalism 
to circumvent the formality of 
institutional separation. Formal 
contracts are constantly supple-
mented by informa l contacts and 
shared values. Indeed, New Zea-
land's experiment with a highly 
disaggrega ted public sector linked 
by contractual agreements has only 
been saved from serious failure and 
total public rejection because of the 
persistence of previous values and 
practices largely ignored by the 
system's proponents. For instance, a 
complex structure of competing 
institutions linked by contractual 
arra ngements has the potential to 
crea te intolerable problems of 
coordina tion and accountabili ty. 
Fortunately, however, these difficul-
ties are minimised by the small 
sca le of New Zealand's policy elite. 
Thanks to Wellington's famous 
village atmosphere, everyone 
bumps into everyone else at lunch-
time on Lambton Quay or a t the 
airport on the way home. Moreover, 
the ad ministrators' universa l fea r of 
causing politica l embarrassmen t to 
themselves or of earning public 
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rebuke from minis ters means that 
the demands of the politicians are 
frequently anticipated without 
being openly articulated. In a 
government system and political 
culture so efficient at internal 
adjustment, often unspoken, the 
attempt to insulate administrative 
decisions from political pressures 
was always going to be difficult, for 
which we may be thankful. 
This dependence of the state 
sector reforms on local values and 
experience raises a wider point 
about the international applicability 
of New Zealand's experimen ts. 
During the 1990s, the New Zealand 
model has been peddled round the 
world by enthusias tic and well-paid 
former politicians and public 
servants. Official blessings have 
been offered by international 
agencies such as the OECD and the 
World Bank and converts have been 
won as far afield as Mongolia. More 
recen tly, however, recognition is 
beginning to dawn that the system 
is not for indiscriminate export. 
Breaking a public sector into 
separate units linked by contracts 
will only work in certain conditions 
which are rare internationally. 
There needs to be a public service 
skilled at informal coordination and 
one sufficien tly hones t to resist the 
new temptations to corruption 
offered by a structure of priva te 
tendering and contracts. 
After relations between minis-
ters and the public service, the other 
key arena of public accountability I 
want to discuss is Parliament. It is 
to Parliament tha t governments are 
required to answer for their actions 
and it is through Parliament that the 
voters exercise their main influence 
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over governments . The state sector 
reforms gave a prominent place to 
Parliament as the constitutional 
authority for approving public 
expenditure and therefore as the 
ultimate purchaser of public 
services. The new specification of 
departmental outputs offers Parlia-
ment and its committees signifi-
cantly more detailed information 
than before and should, in theory, 
have improved the quality of 
parliamentary scrutiny through the 
annual estimates and reporting 
procedures. Electoral reform, too, 
was intended to restore to Parlia-
ment a more prominent role in 
policy-making by diminishing the 
chances of single-party majority 
government. Governments, it was 
hoped, would be forced into more 
open discussion about policy and 
would thus be subject to more 
public scrutiny. 
Some of these expectations have 
certainly been fulfilled . Coalition 
government, and now minority 
government, have increased the 
level of open discussion, argument 
and negotiation about major matters 
of policy. The public's awareness of 
policy-making has been increased 
and so too their indirect influence 
over policy. The process began with 
the 1993 Parliament which was 
marked by an unusual degree of 
government consultation and party 
fluidity as MPs positioned them-
selves for the new system. Parlia-
ment's Standing Orders underwent 
a comprehensive overhaul and the 
capacity of the executive to domi-
nate Parliament's agenda was 
significantly curtailed. In add ition, 
the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 
has required governments to be 
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much more transparent in their 
financial projections. The Act may 
not ha ve produced the degree of 
fiscal restraint originally sought by 
some of its architects. But govern-
ments are now constrained in their 
capacity to fudge the country's 
fiscal position. Public deba tes about 
taxa tion and expenditure over the 
last three years have been con-
ducted on the basis of much more 
reliable and more widely ava ilable 
figures. In so far as the public is 
now in a better position to judge the 
competing fiscal priorities offered 
by different political parties, the 
accountability of politicians has 
been enhanced. The voters too are 
less likely to lose ultimate control 
over the agenda of governments 
through the previously familiar 
device of the post-election crisis. 
There is now less excuse for an 
incoming government to open the 
books, throw up its collective hands 
in horror, and declare that all 
previous commitments must be 
abandoned in the interests of fiscal 
constraint. Paradoxically, Ruth 
Richardson, by championing the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act, deprived 
fu ture finance ministers of the 
conditions on which she, and Roger 
Douglas before her, had depended 
for implementing their radical 
reforms. 
Of course, the reforms have not 
produced the degree of parliamen-
tary independence that some had 
hoped for. In spite of the greatly 
increased level of administrative 
detail available to parliamentary 
committees, the effectiveness of 
committee scrutiny continues to be 
hampered by lack of time and 
resources and by the partisan 
priorities of MPs. Those who had 
hoped for an end to opposition and 
ad versarialism and for more 
consensus across all political parties 
have been disappointed. But such 
hopes were always unrealistic and 
based on a model of Parliament that 
is inappropriate for a modern 
system of parliamentary party 
government. Expectations of 
parliamentary independence and 
consensus were perhaps unduly 
raised by the experience of the 1993, 
pre-MMP Parliament. In retrospect, 
this appears to have been as much a 
unique period of tentative transition 
between two systems as a harbinger 
of the future. Since 1996, there has 
been a resurgence of more accus-
tomed practices of confronta tion . 
This is not necessa rily to be 
regretted. Vigorous political opposi-
tion and adversarialism should be 
seen as the lifeblood of politics not 
its poison. The ceaseless efforts of 
politica l opponents to embarrass 
and unsea t the government is what 
helps to guarantee that government 
decisions come into the open for 
public tes ting and scrutiny. A more 
rea listic goal, and one that the new 
system has more or less achieved , is 
that major policy directions would 
not be taken without public discus-
sion and without the support of a 
reasonably large section of the 
electora te. It is this general congru-
ence between government action 
and public opinion that was for 
many decades guaranteed by 
political conventions of populist 
consultation. New Zealanders had no 
major difficulty with adversarialism 
and two-party competition so long 
as parties stayed close to public 
expectations and competed for the 
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electora l centre. It was the breach-
ing of those conventions in the 
period 1985 to 1991 and the voters' 
determination to re-constrain their 
governments within previous 
populist limits that led so many 
voters to support the new system. 
MMP seems set to satisfy this aim of 
reasserting the previous populist 
conventions. The post-election 
process of nego tiation over a 
coalition, drawn out though it may 
have been, did bring many issues 
out into the open and remained a 
more constraining document than 
the normal manifesto of the past, at 
least w hile the coalition survived. 
To this we should add the signifi-
cantly more representative nature of 
the MMP Parliament, particularly in 
so far it includes for the first time a 
truly proportionate number of 
Maori MPs. In general, then, MMP 
has done much to restore and 
enhance the accountability of 
politicians to the electorate. 
The biggest failure of MMP in 
1996 was its inability to provide 
what New Zealanders have always 
expected of their electoral system, 
and w hich First Past the Post 
provides so well, namely a means of 
getting rid of an unpopular govern-
ment. The main blame must be 
sheeted home to Wins ton Peters and 
his New Zealand First Party. Survey 
resea rch has confirmed that a 
majority of New Zealand First 
voters preferred an anti-National 
coalition and expected their party to 
support one. The failure of Peters 
and his party to keep faith with 
these expectations through blatant 
personal opportunism was unfor-
givable and , indeed, w ill not be 
fo rgiven. Such beha viour was 
politically irrational, in terms of the 
long-term future of the party, and 
was therefore unforeseen by 
rationa l ana lysts, among w hom 
must be included members of the 
Roya l Commission. We all assumed 
that, because voters would want to 
know and depend on the likely 
coalition intentions of each party, 
parties would have an incentive to 
provide such indications and to 
stick by them. In the event, the fate 
of New Zealand First merely 
confirms the wisdom of such advice 
w hich will no doubt be followed by 
all par ties in the next election. 
With the collapse of New 
Zealand First, we appear to be 
witnessing the re-establishment of 
two-party politics with two major 
parties competing for government, 
one left-of centre and the other 
right-of-centre. This ma y encourage 
thoughts of returning to the former, 
First Past the Post electoral system 
which generated the two-party 
sys tem in the first place. Certainly, 
there are plenty of powerful people 
who would like to see the former 
sys tem restored. The last two years 
have been a trying time for support-
ers of the change as their often 
unrea l expecta tions ha ve been 
confronted by the unedifying antics 
of some of the participants who 
have brought the system into 
disrepute . It has been a good time to 
be out of the country and to be 
away from the regular drip-feed of 
embarrassing incidents relayed by 
gleeful journalists keen to disparage 
the new system. Political journalists, 
by and large, prefer the old, simpler 
sys tem w here power was more 
concentrated and they knew who 
had it. They have not been among 
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the new system's supporters and 
have done much, consciously and 
unconsciously, to undermine it. At 
the same time, it must be admitted 
that journalists have had plen ty of 
embarrassing material to work w ith 
as new, inexperienced MPs stumble 
and old ones try to learn new tricks. 
No doubt much of this can be put 
down to transitional problems but 
they are taking time to work 
through. 
In the meantime, the electoral 
system, once subject to change, has 
become part of the contestable 
electoral agenda. Thirty years ago, 
when I fi rst came to Wellington to 
lecture, the country faced a crisis in 
the balance of payments and people 
were criticising the ineffectual 
response of the government. 
Nobody thought of blaming the 
electoral system. Today, when the 
economy is once again in crisis, 
people can blame not only the 
ineffectual response of the govern-
ment but also the elec toral system 
itself. Such conflict about the basic 
rules of the political game, though 
inevitable in the short term, can 
only serve to destabilise politics 
generally. It is to be hoped that the 
next election w ill sufficiently 
en trench the new sys tem that 
another major change is ruled out. 
At least, it should be clear that those 
pressing for a return to First Past 
the Post are not seeking a return to 
New Zealand's traditional patterns 
of populist, democratic government. 
They have in mind the system as it 
operated in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, an electi ve dictatorship bent 
on radical change with minimum 
accountability and consultation. 
MMP may be reflecting a basic 
N E \V z_£ A l A N 0 S T U D I E 5 
bipolar division in New Zealand 
politi cs and the return of two-party 
alternation. But it will do so with 
the valuable supplementation that 
the two major centrist parties are 
now flanked by minor parti es to 
keep them hones t. Neither major 
party is likely to have a majority in 
its own right and each will require 
the support of others to govern. In 
this respect, MMP in operation ma y 
be reflecting underlying continuities 
in New Zealand 's political culture -
alterna ting major parties of the 
centre-right and centre left under 
pressure not to stray too far from 
public opinion. Those w ho have 
sought a return to the type of con-
sultative politics with which Keith 
Holyoake or Norman Kirk or even 
Robert Muldoon were fami liar will 
be well advised to stick with MMP. 
No t that the system is beyond 
improvement. Apart from the 
necessary adaptation of politicians 
and vo ters, which was bound to 
take a little time, there are a number 
of mechanical changes that are 
worth making. I will mention two, 
both of which I think would have 
been supported by the Roya l 
Commission if we had reconvened. 
The first is ending the waiver of the 
5% threshold for parties that win 
electorate sea ts. The supposed 
rationale for the waiver, adopted 
from Germany, is tha t any party 
with sufficient support to win an 
electorate, should be entitled to its 
share of list seats, even if it has not 
secured 5% of the total nationwide 
vote. The rationale is weak and 
outmoded , being based on giving 
electorate seats a value which is 
inconsistent with the party propor-
tional principles of MMP. More 
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important, as was demonstrated 
here in Wellington Central, it can 
encourage tactical voting which is 
perverse and potentially unfair. 
Secondly, I would strongly support 
moves to require list MPs who 
resign from their parties to leave 
Parliament as well. They have no 
authentic standing as independent 
MPs. Not that electorate MPs who 
resign from their parties have much 
credibility (though they have 
sligh tly more under MMP than 
under First Past the Post) . It is to be 
hoped that there w ill be opportu-
nity to introduce these and possibly 
other minor improvements before 
the stampede to overthrow the 
sys tem as a w hole. 
One other, less immedia te issue 
is at least worth raising, that of 
voter turnout. The number of voters 
w ho exercise their right is an 
important measure of political 
accountability because it determines 
the degree of a ttention that politi-
cians and the political sys tem 
generally give to the voters' prefer-
ences. If significant sections of the 
electorate do not exercise their vote 
then their interes ts can be safe! y 
ignored, particularly when they 
clash with those who vote in large 
numbers. There is a worldwide 
trend in developed countries for 
turnout levels to decline. World 
leader in this trend, as in so many 
others, is the United States where 
turnout in presidential elec tions has 
fallen well below 50%. The US 
political agenda has become domi-
nated by the voting minority, drawn 
disproportionately from those who 
are wealthier and older. By world 
standards, New Zealand has always 
had very high levels of voter 
turnout. But it has not been exempt 
from the worldwide decline. This 
was halted in the last two elections, 
presumably because of heightened 
interest in the election system itself 
and also because, under MMP, the 
number of supposedly 'wasted' 
votes is reduced. But such effects 
are probably temporary and 
gradual decline may reassert itself. 
Advice from Australia is always 
unwelcome in New Zealand and I 
hesitate to mention the institution of 
compulsory voting which is as 
entrenched across the Tasman as 
voluntary voting is here. But New 
Zealanders who care about demo-
cratic participation and the effec-
tiveness of political accountability 
will, I suspect, be increasingly 
drawn to compulsory voting as a 
means of reducing the growing 
inequality. The longer this issue is 
left off the political agenda, the 
harder its introduction will become. 
As turnout declines, the more 
difference compulsory voting 
would make to the outcome of 
elections and the more vested 
interests will be ranged against it. 
Better to start thinking about it now. 
So much for the future. Return-
ing to the theme of assessing New 
Zealand's experiments, the main 
general conclusion is one of caution 
about drawing general conclusions. 
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Local historical experience and 
political culture are crucial to 
understanding both the reasons for 
the changes and their effects. 
Attempts to export the so-called 
New Zealand model of institutional 
change will fail if they are insensi-
tive to local conditions. Confining 
ourselves to effects within New 
Zealand, the assessment of New 
Zealand's experiments to date is 
that, in some respects they have 
succeeded in asserting the public's 
democratic right to call its govern-
ments to account. New Zealand 
ends the 1990s with its public 
service more tightly under political 
control and its politicians more 
responsive to public opinion than. 
when the decade began. In that 
sense, accountability and democ-
racy may be said to have been 
enhanced. At the same time, we 
need to remember the broader, 
contrary trends of globalisation 
mentioned earlier. These reforms 
have taken place within a context in 
which governments have surren-
dered some of their power to 
govern and political communities 
have less capacity to control their 
destinies. Democracy is in general 
retreat worldwide. In such circum-
stances, what is at issue is the extent 
and speed of loss. New Zealand 
governments have, in some 
respects, been eager to hasten this 
trend, most notably in their willing-
ness to divest themselves of state 
assets and to distance public 
agencies from ministerial direction. 
On the other hand, certain elements 
in New Zealand's democratic 
political culture have been remark-
ably resilient, notably the public's 
concern to hold politicians to 
account and the public servants' 
willingness to accept political 
direction. While the scope of 
government may have shrunk, the 
extent of popular influence within 
the state's remaining orbit has, in 
some important respects, been 
enhanced. At the very least, the 
retreat of democracy has been 
fiercely contested and is certainly 
not a rout. eS' 
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